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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by Robert G. Boliek, Jr.*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed
a wide array of significant issues in the area of appellate practice and
procedure in 2009.' However, the most significant decision for the
Eleventh Circuit in the area of appellate procedure came from the
United States Supreme Court. In Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,2 the Supreme Court affirmed a 2008 Eleventh Circuit decision in
which the court held that the collateral order doctrine does not allow for
an immediate appeal of an order requiring the disclosure of evidence
purportedly protected by the attorney-client privilege.3
Accordingly, this Article will first discuss Carpenter in the context of
the Eleventh Circuit's appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order
doctrine and then discuss other significant cases in which the Eleventh
Circuit elaborated upon the question of its jurisdiction. This Article will
then discuss cases in which the Eleventh Circuit addressed issues such
as the timeliness of the filing of a notice of appeal in criminal cases, the
preservation of error in cases referred to magistrate judges, and a
number of cases deciding or elaborating upon the applicable standard of
review.
I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

As the Eleventh Circuit has recently noted, "for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction over an appeal, our jurisdiction must be both (1) authorized
by statute and (2) within constitutional limits."4 As a practical matter,
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1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit appellate practice and procedure during the prior
survey period, see Robert G. Boliek, Jr., Appellate Practiceand Procedure,2008 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1129 (2009).
2. 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009), affg 541 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 2008).
3. Id. at 603.
4. OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir.
2008).
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the first requirement for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction ("authorized by statute") usually means that the decision from which the appeal
is taken must be a "final" decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 5
Section 1291 is the "workhorse" jurisdictional statute for the courts of
jurisdiction
appeals because it "'generally vests courts of appeals with
6
over appeals from "final decisions" of the district courts.'"
Appeals from "Final"Decisions

A.

Usually, "[a final decision is one that 'ends the litigation on the merits
7
and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment."'
Notwithstanding this definition, a limited number of decisions are
considered "final" for purposes of § 1291 despite the fact that they do not
end the litigation on the merits.8
1.

The "CollateralOrder"Doctrine

Among such "final" decisions are those that qualify as "collateral
orders" under the "collateral order doctrine." The collateral order
doctrine is "a 'practical construction' of the final decision rule [that]
permits appeals from 'a small category of decisions that, although they
do not end the litigation, must nonetheless be considered "final."'" 9 The
doctrine had its origin in the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v.

5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291(2006); W.R. HuffAsset Mgmt. Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts
& Co., 566 F.3d 979, 984 (11th Cir. 2009). While "[iun general, the final judgment rule
permits an appeal to the circuit court only from a final judgment," some statutes provide
that appeals of interlocutory decisions "are permissible ... in certain limited situations."
19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 202.05[1] (3d ed. 2009). A
familiar example is an appeal from orders relating to injunctive relief authorized by 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006). Various other statutes also permit appeals-final, interlocutory,
or both-in particular instances. For instance, a 2009 case of interest to immigration
practitioners is the case of Avila v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 560 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2009), in
which the Eleventh Circuit held that an order of reinstatement of an order of removal was
a "final" order under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2006), and
in a matter of first impression for the circuit, that § 1252(b)(2) of the Act was a venue
provision and not a jurisdictional limitation. Avila, 560 F.3d at 1283-85. As a result, the
Eleventh Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal of an order of reinstatement issued in
Miami, Florida, id. at 1285, despite the fact that the initial order of removal had been
issued in Arlington, Virginia, id. at 1283.
6. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 566 F.3d at 984 (quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton
County, 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999)).
7. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 541 F.3d 1048, 1052 (lth Cir. 2008) (quoting
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007)), aftd, 130
S. Ct. 599 (2009).
8. See id.
9. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S.
35, 42 (1995)).
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Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp."° "Under Cohen, an order is appealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves
an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action;
1
and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."
a. The Supreme Court's 2009 Decision in Mohawk Industries v.
Carpenter. In 2008 the Eleventh Circuit decided Carpenterv. Mohawk
Industries, Inc.," a case the Supreme Court would ultimately review.1 3 In Carpenter the Eleventh Circuit was presented with the
appeal of an order requiring the production of documents claimed to be
protected by the attorney-client privilege.14 After noting the uncontroversial proposition that "discovery orders are normally not immediately
appealable,"' 5 the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that "[tihis circuit
ha[d] not, however, directly addressed the question of whether a
discovery order compelling the disclosure of information claimed to be
protected by the attorney-client privilege can be appealed before final
judgment under6 Cohen" as well as the existence of a split in the circuits
on the matter.'
In addressing the third requirement of the Cohen test, the Eleventh
Circuit "conclude[d] that the challenged discovery order [was] not an
appealable collateral order under Cohen."" The Eleventh Circuit
explained that it did "not find that a discovery order... implicat[ing]
the attorney-client privilege [was] effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment."" In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit relied on
its precedent denying application of the doctrine to an appeal involving
an order requiring disclosure of material implicating the accountant-client privilege and the fact that "[the] Court ha[d] never exercised
[its] jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review any
Instead, the Eleventh
discovery order involving any privilege."' 9

10. 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Carpenter,541 F.3d at 1052.
11. Carpenter, 541 F.3d at 1052 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978)).
12. 541 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 2008), affd, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009). The portion of this
discussion addressing the Eleventh Circuit's treatment of the issues in Carpenterreiterates
that contained in last year's survey. See Robert G. Boliek, Jr., 2008 Eleventh Circuit
Survey, Appellate Practice and Procedure, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1129, 1130-31 (2009).
13. See Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. 599.
14. See Carpenter,541 F.3d at 1050.
15. Id. at 1052.
16. Id. at 1053 (stating that "[a] number of circuits have addressed the issue, and there
are decisions on both sides").
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1052 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 1053.
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Circuit held that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the appropriate
remedy for the prejudgment review of discovery orders, including those
implicating privileges.20
In 2009 the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split by affirming the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter,1
a case of historical, as well as procedural, interest because it was Justice
Sotomayor's first opinion for the Court.22 In affirming the Eleventh
Circuit, the Supreme Court limited its opinion to the question of whether
an order of disclosure was "effectively unreviewable" under the third
requirement of Cohen and in essence agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis by holding that "[p]ostjudgment appeals, together with other
review mechanisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and preserve
the vitality of the attorney-client privilege."23
Of particular interest was the Supreme Court's reiteration of the
principle that "the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain
'narrow and selective in its membership"'24 to avoid potentially
burdensome piecemeal appeals to the circuit courts.25 The Court
recognized that "[tihis admonition has acquired special force in recent
years with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, 'not
expansion by court decision,' as the preferred means for determining
whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable."26 Consequently, the Court concluded:
We expect that the combination of standard post judgment appeals,
§ 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and contempt appeals will continue to
provide adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose materials
purportedly subject to the attorney-client privilege. Any further
avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if at
all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for full airing it
provides. 7

20. See id. at 1053-54. As an alternate remedy for either the very brave or the very
desperate, the Eleventh Circuit also noted that another avenue of relief might include
appealing an order of contempt in the face of a refusal to produce allegedly privileged
material, so long as the order of contempt appealed from was a final judgment involving
a non-contingent sanction. See id. at 1054-55. The Eleventh Circuit also went on to hold
that the high standards for issuing the extraordinary writ of mandamus had not been met
in Carpenter. Id. at 1055.
21. 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
22. 78 U.S.L.W. 1345 (Dec. 15, 2009).
23. Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 603.
24. Id. at 609 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006)).
25. Id. at 608.
26. Id. at 609 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 48).
27. Id.
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In short, the federal courts continue to receive appeals of previously
unrecognized or novel collateral orders with little sympathy. As a result,
their recognition will likely depend on the rulemaking process and not
on litigation.
b. The Eleventh Circuit's Collateral Order Decisions. While a
decision may sometimes be "effectively unreviewable on appeal" under
Cohen's third requirement because it requires a party to face burdensome litigation it would not otherwise have to face, the Eleventh Circuit
carefully adheres to the proposition that "to prevent the erosion of the
final judgment rule, 'it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of
a trial that would imperil a substantialpublic interest, that counts when
asking whether an order is "effectively" unreviewable if review is to be
left until later."'28 Although courts frequently address the question of
whether a stay order is "final" for purposes of an appeal under the
"effectively out of court" doctrine discussed below,29 the Eleventh
Circuit analyzed the stay order issued in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Florida v. South Florida Water Management District" under the
collateral order doctrine as well. In Miccosukee Tribe, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida issued a stay order
deferring decision until such time as the Eleventh Circuit decided an
appeal in a related case. 3 ' The Eleventh Circuit held that the stay was
not appealable under the collateral order doctrine.3 2 Specifically, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the "important issue[s]" of federalism or
international comity are not implicated by such a stay3 (as would be
the case with stays in favor of state or foreign court proceedings).34
Accordingly, the plaintiffs had no "substantial public interest" in
asserting a right to simultaneously prosecute two federal lawsuits with
common issues and could not justify an immediate appeal.35

28. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1340 n.7 (quoting Will, 546 U.S. at 353) (emphasis added).
29. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
30. 559 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009).
31. See id. at 1193.
32. Id. at 1200.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit treated the "substantial public interest"
consideration of the collateral order doctrine as part of Cohen's second requirement-that
the order resolve an "important issue" that is separate from the rest of the litigation-rather than as part of the third requirement. Id. at 1199-1200. See supra note 28
and accompanying text.
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Moreover, in W.R. Huff Asset Management Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis,
Roberts & Co.,36 the Eleventh Circuit recognized that an order of a
federal district court may be "effectively reviewable" on appeal, even
when that appeal will be in a state court.37 In particular, the court
held that an order granting leave to amend a complaint substituting
parties and resulting in the destruction of subject matter jurisdiction3"
is not a collateral order because the order can be reviewed after remand
in the state appellate courts, 39 at least where the state courts would not

be collaterally estopped from reaching the merits and are otherwise
competent to apply the underlying federal law governing the case.40
2. Stay Orders
"The general rule is that a stay is not a final disposition, and thus not
immediately appealable."4 ' An exception exists, however, "for stays
that put a plaintiff 'effectively out of court,' and in applying that
exception [the Eleventh Circuit] ha[s] held that a stay order that is
immoderate and involves a protracted and indefinite period of delay is
final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "42 As the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Miccosukee Tribe makes clear, however, the
"effectively out of court" doctrine is unlikely to apply to a stay issued in
favor of related proceedings in another federal forum."
The Eleventh Circuit noted, "Because [the stay] does not require the
federal court plaintiffs to await a decision from a non-federal court or
other tribunal, they have not been put effectively out of court in the
traditional way."" The Eleventh Circuit noted as well that a stay that
denies a federal forum for an indefinite period of time4 5 constitutes a
final order under the effectively out of court doctrine only in cases in
which the plaintiff is effectively out of court for "no good reason," such

36. 566 F.3d 979 (11th Cir. 2009).
37. Id. at 985-86.
38. Id. at 982.
39. Id. at 985-86.
40. See id. The order of remand itself was not reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(2006); the appellants in W.R. Huff Asset Management Co. sought application of a limited
exception to § 1447(d) that allows for review of orders that lead to but are separate from
the order of remand-here, the order granting leave to amend. 566 F.3d at 983. Such
separate orders must themselves be final, however, for the appellate court to exercise
jurisdiction over them. See id. at 984.
41. King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2007).
42. Id.
43. See 559 F.3d at 1196.
44. Id.
45. In Miccosukee Tribe, the Eleventh Circuit referred to this as the "suspended
animation" aspect of the effectively out-of-court doctrine. See id. at 1196-97.

20101

APPELLATE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1023

as when "there [ius little likelihood that the other forums' decisions
would control or significantly inform the litigation."46 In Miccosukee
Tribe, however, "the reason for the district court's stay was at least a
good one, if not an excellent one: to await a federal appellate decision
that [was] likely to have a substantial or controlling effect on the claims
and issues in the stayed case.""
3. Orders of Remand to Administrative Agencies
In World Fuel Corp. v. Geithner,48 the Eleventh Circuit reminded
litigants that a remand order from a district court to an administrative
agency is generally not a final appealable order for purposes of § 129149
and expanded the class of such non-final orders to include orders of
remand that require an agency to formulate "a new legal standard
appropriate for the statute at issue."5" Such an order is distinguishable
from previously recognized "final" orders of remand that require an
agency to apply a legal standard the district court has itself formulated. 1 In the latter cases, the requirement of finality is met because the
agency, "'forced to conform its decision to the district court's mandate,
cannot appeal its own subsequent order.'"52
4. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction
Certain otherwise unappealable, non-final decisions may very rarely
be reached on appeal under the doctrine of "pendent appellate jurisdiction." The Eleventh Circuit emphasized the limits of pendent appellate
jurisdiction in King v. Cessna Aircraft Co.," a case in which the court
was presented with an appeal from a final order dismissing numerous
foreign plaintiffs on the ground of forum non conveniens and a non-final
order denying the dismissal of the case of the sole American decedent on
the same grounds.
In a decision notable for its thorough discussion
of the applicable law-including the recognition that "pendent appellate
jurisdiction should be present only under rare circumstances"--the

46. Id. at 1197.
47. Id. at 1198.
48. 568 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2009).
49. Id. at 1348.
50. Id. at 1349.

51.

See id.

52.

Id. at 1348 (quoting MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 298 F.3d

1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002)).
53.

562 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 2009), cert denied sub nom. Forsman v. Cessna Aircraft

Co., 130 S. Ct. 324 (2009) (mem.).
54. Id. at 1378.
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Eleventh Circuit explained that pendent appellate jurisdiction "is
present when a nonappealable decision is 'inextricably intertwined' with
the appealable decision or when 'review of the former decision [is]
necessary to ensure meaningful review of the latter.'"5 5 Because the
district court's forum non conveniens analysis "was conducted separately
for both groups," and "a determination of the propriety of the district
court's refusal to dismiss [the American decedent's case was] not
necessary to resolve the propriety of its decision to dismiss" the foreign
plaintiffs,5 6 the Eleventh Circuit concluded it lacked pendent appellate
jurisdiction over the denial of the motion to dismiss.5 7
B.

Remand Orders in Removal Cases
A corollary of the fact that appellate jurisdiction must be "authorized
by statute" is that what Congress gives, it may also limit-power that
is amply illustrated by the circumscribed review afforded remand orders
in cases asserting removal jurisdiction."
However, in Corporate
Management Advisors, Inc. v. Artjen Complexus, Inc.,"' the Eleventh
Circuit recognized that a sua sponte remand order for procedural defects
in the removal process may be reviewed by appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d), as distinguished from a sua sponte remand order for a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, which is unreviewable.6 ° Moreover, the
Eleventh Circuit also noted that "the failure to establish a party's
citizenship at the time of filing the removal notice is a 'procedural,
rather than a jurisdictional, defect.'"61 Accordingly, a district court
must await a party's motion before ordering a remand based on the
failure to establish citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction in
the removal notice;62 in addition, free amendment of such jurisdictional
allegations should be allowed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653.63
C.

ConstitutionalLimitations on Appellate Jurisdiction:Mootness
The fact that a statute confers appellate jurisdiction over the appeal
of a particular decision does not end the jurisdictional inquiry. This is

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1379 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 51).
Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1381.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).
561 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1296.
Id. (quoting In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1993)).
See id. at 1296-97.
28 U.S.C. § 1653 (2006); Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, 561 F.3d at 1297.
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because, as noted above,' the appellate court's jurisdiction must also
be "within constitutional limits,"6 5 including the requirement that the
decision to be reviewed presents a "live" controversy: "The doctrine of
mootness, which evolved directly from Article III's['] case-or-controversy limitation, provides that 'the requisite personal interest that must
exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue
throughout its existence (mootness). ' '67 Thus, "'[a] case is moot when
with respect to which the court
it no longer presents a live' controversy
8
can give meaningful relief. '6
Moreover, as noted above,69 while a party may invoke 28 U.S.C.
§ 1653 to correct faulty jurisdictional allegations, § 1653 does not allow
for the correction of jurisdictional facts, including facts demonstrating
that an appeal is moot, as the Eleventh Circuit made clear in San
70
Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. 7027 Old Madison Pike, LLC.
There, the clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama had disbursed certain funds at issue on the appeal
to a nonparty-funds the appellant had been previously deposited into
the court registry.7 1 The Eleventh Circuit held that no "meaningful
relief' could be granted to the appellant regarding these funds because
they were in the hands of a stranger to the suit over which the district
court had no jurisdiction. 72 As such, the court held that the appeal was
moot regarding any relief the appellant requested with respect to the
nonparty. 73 Moreover, the appellant had not requested reimbursement
of the funds from the appellee in the district court, and thus, there was
no basis to support the appeal on this alternative ground-a jurisdictional "fact" that the appellant could not "correct" on appeal by invoking
§ 1653. 74
II.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE TAKING OF AN APPEAL

Even when jurisdiction exists under a statute and there is no
constitutional bar to the exercise of the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction,

64. See supra text accompanying note 4.
65. OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1355.
66. U.S. CONST. art. III.
67. Frulla v. CRA Holdings, Inc., 543 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C. v. Fayette County, Ga., 451 F.3d 777, 785 (11th Cir. 2006)).
68. Id. at 1251 (quoting Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 1993)).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
70. 583 F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 2009).
71. See id. at 753-54.
72. Id. at 755.
73. Id.
74. See id.
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the procedural requirements for taking the appeal must be carefully
observed. These requirements can themselves be jurisdictional, and
even when they are not, the Eleventh Circuit often requires scrupulous
adherence to the rules before it will reach the merits.75
The case of United States v. Lopez7 6 illustrates this proposition.
Under the rationale of Bowles v. Russell," the Eleventh Circuit
overruled its panel precedent and held that the time limit for the filing
of a notice of appeal in a criminal case under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(b)78 is not jurisdictional because the time limit arises from
the court-adopted rules of procedure rather than the statutory limitations fixed by Congress.79 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit recognized
that under the rationale of Bowles the deadline in Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)8" "for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case
is mandatory and jurisdictional because it is grounded in a federal
statute."8' Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal in
the criminal case of Lopez as untimely, noting that the government had
not forfeited this objection by failing to raise it in the district court;
indeed, the objection of timeliness
may be raised by an appellee "for the
82
first time in its merit brief."

III.

PRESERVATION AND PRESENTATION OF ERROR

Issues not properly preserved in the district court or issues preserved
but not presented in the briefs on appeal are generally waived,'
although an exception exists in the criminal context for the preservation
of certain "plain errors" that affect substantial rights.' In Williams v.

75. See United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2009).
76. 562 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2009).
77. 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
78. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b).
79. Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1313.
80. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
81. Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1312 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006)).
82. Id. at 1313.
83. See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc. v. Contl Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1313 (11th Cir.
2007). For example, in United States v. White, 590 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009), the
Eleventh Circuit held that an objection to venue that had been raised in a post-judgment
motion was untimely because it was not presented prior to trial, and there was a lack of
evidence that the defendant "was unaware of his constitutional right" to be tried in a
district where the offense occurred. Id. at 1214.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(recognizing the distinction between unintentional "forfeitures" of substantial rights by a
failure to timely object, which are entitled to plain error review, from intentional "waivers,"
which are not).
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McNeil," a case of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, 6 the
court addressed the waiver of arguments made in cases referred to
magistrate judges and concluded that "a district court has discretion to
decline to consider a party's argument when that argument was not first
presented to the magistrate judge,"" including arguments raised for
the first time in an objection to the magistrate's report and recommendation.88 As a consequence, litigants run the risk of waiving arguments
not properly raised before a magistrate. 89 If, as was the case in
Williams, a party raises an argument for the first time before the
district court, and the district court declines to consider that argument,
then the Eleventh Circuit will regard the matter as having been waived
for purposes of appeal, at least in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 90
IV.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Assuming the existence of the appellate court's jurisdiction and that
such procedural requirements as the timely filing of a notice of appeal
or the appropriate petition have been satisfied, few issues are more
critical to the success of an appeal than the standard of review.91 "In
even moderately close cases, the standard of review may be dispositive
of an appellate court's decision."92
A.

Post-GallReview of FederalSentences

Perhaps the most important standard of review the Eleventh Circuit
has recently addressed is the standard for reviewing federal sentencing
decisions in the wake of Gall v. United States,9 3 which requires that
courts apply an abuse of discretion standard in a two-step process.94
First, the reviewing court should "'ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error.'"95 Second, "Gall directs

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
2007).
92.
93.
94.
95.
at 51).

557 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2747 (2009) (mem.).
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1288.
See id. at 1292.
See id.
See News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1187 (11th Cir.
Id.
552 U.S. 38 (2007).
See id. at 51.
United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.
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consider the substantive reasonthat 'the appellate court should then
96
ableness of the sentence imposed.'"
The Eleventh Circuit continued to elaborate on the ramifications of the
Gall standard in 2009. One of the more instructive cases is United
States v. Livesayy in which the Eleventh Circuit again reversed the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama in a
series of sentencing decisions in a case involving a "white-collar"
defendant accused of corporate fraud.98 The Eleventh Circuit had
previously reversed a below-the-guidelines sentence in the same case in
2008 because of "procedural error" under the first step of the Gall
standard.99 The Eleventh Circuit based the prior decision on its
conclusion that "the district court [had] committed procedural Gall error
by basing the extent of its. . . departure on an impermissible consideration: specifically, [the defendant's] repudiation of or withdrawal from
the conspiracy." "
In the 2009 appeal, the Eleventh Circuit was presented with no such
procedural error, but instead reversed the district court's below-theguidelines sentence under Gall's second requirement.1"' In particular,
the Eleventh Circuit held that a sentence of probation was "substantively unreasonable," not only on the basis that such a sentence did not
reasonably reflect the seriousness of the crime, which involved enormous
amounts of money, but also on what the Eleventh Circuit felt was the
sentence's limited deterrent effect in white-collar cases. 10 2

"[Ilt is

difficult to imagine a would-be white-collar criminal being deterred from
stealing millions of dollars from his company by the threat of a purely
probationary sentence, regardless of how much probation that person
received."' °3 Thus, the two post-Gall Livesay opinions give valuable
insights into the Eleventh Circuit's approach to review under Gall,
especially in white-collar cases, because they represent two separate
reversals of the same case under each aspect of the Gall standard.
In contrast, in United States v. Jordan, 4 the Eleventh Circuit
applied Gall to affirm a below-the-guidelines sentence in a case involving
In Jordan an incumbent
the improper use of a criminal database.'

96. Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
97. 587 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2009).
98. Id. at 1276, 1279.
99. Id. at 1277.

100.
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1278-79.
Id. at 1279.
582 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 1244, 1249-51.

Id. at 1279.
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lost a close and hotly contested race for county sheriff. Suspecting voter
fraud, the incumbent retained counsel for a possible election contest, and
the lawyer in turn enlisted a member of the sheriff's staff to examine the
database in the hope of proving that felons had illegally voted in the
election. A jury ultimately concluded that the examination of the
database violated federal law."'° The court sentenced the lawyer to a
fine and to probation' °7 rather than the minimum prison term that
would have been applicable under the sentencing guidelines. 1 8 In
affirming the below-the-guidelines sentence, the Eleventh Circuit relied
in part on the finding of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama that "the offense involved very little
planning or concealment and could easily have been discovered."'"
One possible lesson to take from Livesay and Jordan may be that in
"white-collar" and similar cases, the Eleventh Circuit is more likely to
apply Gall to affirm a below-the-guidelines sentence when the defendant's conduct lacks the kind of calculation and planning the Eleventh
Circuit has held will be more effectively deterred by a sentence that is
within the guidelines.
B. "De Novo" Standard of Review Applies to a District Court's Order
Interpreting Injunction Issued by Another Judge
In Alley v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,1 0 a case
in which the question of the standard of review presented an issue of
first impression for the Eleventh Circuit,"' the court concluded that
a district court judge's interpretation of an injunction issued by another
judge is entitled to no deference and will be reviewed de novo."' The
question arose because the order appealed from interpreted an injunction
initially issued thirty years before by a judge in another district that
limited a predecessor agency of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) from releasing certain medical reimbursement records
under the Freedom of Information Act." 3 The injunction had remained in force after all these years, and the plaintiff sought to require
the release of reimbursement records notwithstanding the HHS's argument that the injunction prevented their release. The district court

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1244-45.
Id. at 1245.
See id. at 1249-50.
Id. at 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted).
590 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Alley, 590 F.3d at 1198.
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concluded that release of the particular information the plaintiff sought
was not precluded by the injunction and ordered its release, a decision
the HHS appealed.' 14
Addressing the standard of review, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
while "[wie do review a district court's interpretation of its own orders
only for an abuse of discretion," including orders relating to injunctions,
"it does not follow that the standard applies to one judge's interpretation
of an injunction issued by another judge."'15 In particular, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "any insider knowledge that a judge may
have about her own orders would not extend to the orders of another
judge," and "[tihere is no reason to believe that a district court judge
would have any advantage over the judges of this Court in interpreting
an injunction issued by another district judge."" 6 Under the de novo
standard of review, the Eleventh Circuit held that the injunction
precluded release of the records the plaintiff sought and reversed the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama,
rejecting what it ultimately considered the plaintiff's "attempt to
collaterally attack" an injunction issued by a judge who sat in another
district. 117 Instead, if a plaintiff "believes [an] injunction is invalid,
overly broad, or outdated," the plaintiff's remedy is to "challenge it in
[the district where it was issued] after joining all necessary parties.""'
C. "Abuse of Discretion"Standard of Review Applies to Sua Sponte
Dismissal of Complaint Due to the Plaintiff'sFailureto 71mely Effect
Service
In Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 9 a case in which the
standard of review presented another issue of first impression for the
Eleventh Circuit, 2 ° the court concluded that the "abuse of discretion"
standard applies to a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint
for failure to effect timely service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(m). 2' Moreover, while this standard is highly deferential, it is not
completely "without teeth," as the court's decision in Rance itself
demonstrates. In Rance the Eleventh Circuit reversed the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida's order of dismissal

114. Alley, 590 F.3d at 1200-02.
115. Id. at 1202.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1210.
118. Id.
119. 583 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2009).
120. Id. at 1286.
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); Rance, 583 F.3d at 1286.
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without prejudice when the complaint of a pro se plaintiff (who was
proceeding in forma pauperis)was dismissed without prejudice because
the United States Marshal failed to timely effectuate service without any
fault on the part of the plaintiff.'2 2 The Eleventh Circuit held that in
such circumstances the district court abused its discretion in failing to
consider the extent to which the marshal's failure constituted "good
cause" for the failure to serve that warranted an extension of the
deadline. 2 '

122.
123.

Rance, 583 F.3d at 1288.
See id.

